Studio Incendo
Pro-democracy protests erupted in Hong Kong March 31. Here, thousands take to the streets in August 2019.
On October 1, Beijing celebrated the 70th anniversary of the founding of the current Chinese regime. President Xi Jinping, arguably the most powerful Chinese leader since Chairman Mao Zedong, showed his prowess with a huge military parade. The message was clear: he will quell any resistance to the state without mercy.
Many protesters in Hong Kong, however, remain defiant. On that very day, both moderate and militant protesters went into streets across the city in spite of a police ban. The protests were met with the most violent police repression since the beginning of the Anti-Extradion Law Amendent Bill (or anti-ELAB) Movement on March 31. An eighteen-year-old protester, still a high school student, was shot non-fatally in his chest by a police officer using live ammunition. A few days later, as if the situation was not bad enough, the Hong Kong government invoked a draconian “emergency law,” enacted during the colonial period, to ban masks in all assemblies. Two days later, thousands of protesters marched on the streets again, and the rallies soon turned violent. Wednesday will mark four months to the day since the first major protests began in Hong Kong.
One cannot help but wonder: how will all this end?
While I was back in Hong Kong during summer break, whenever I spoke with friends, there was not a single time we did not touch on this question. Indeed, what can be done to draw Hong Kong out of this distressing chaos is probably the most urgent question for many Hong Kongers. However, despite this urgency, I believe an end is not at hand.
The government’s tactics are obvious. Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam and her colleagues believe that they can put all of the militants into jail, and then enter into a “dialogue” with the moderates. It is not working—at least it has not up until now. Even though many moderates may have grown tired of protesting, and are fed up with militant tactics such as setting fires and fighting with police officers and political opponents, surveys have shown that they have no trust in the government either. They do not believe Lam has any integrity left.
Given the impasse, I see two possible outcomes.
One has been suggested by Professors Jeffrey Kopstein and Jeffrey Wasserstrom at the University of California, Irvine. The Hong Kong government may successfully suppress all militant resistance, and strongly restrict moderate rallies, they say. The police could further militarize and bear down on monitoring of the opposition and civil society groups. The government may invoke the emergency law again, and ban certain digital communication platforms such as Telegram and Facebook. In other words, Hong Kong may become very much like Poland after the Soviet crackdown in 1981.
However, that the public order is “restored” does not mean the government can regain its legitimacy. Most people may stay home but not because they are satisfied with the political situation, but because they are simply too afraid. Yet, when a political opportunity (or threat) arises, latent resentment against the government will break out again. Or in some cases, some groups may try to test the boundaries of repression with less disruptive action. In the 1980s, the Orange Alternative of Poland organized sardonic parades which mocked the government, yet successfully avoided arrest and conviction. Similar action may take place in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong may become very much like Poland after the Soviet crackdown in 1981.
The second possible scenario is even darker. Hong Kong may become another Northern Ireland during the years of “The Troubles” (1968-1998).. Because of official suppression, major rallies may become rare. Militant protesters, however, may become even more radical and develop into paramilitary units. While it is extremely difficult to acquire arms in Hong Kong, we have already witnessed the use of homemade petrol bombs. On the other hand, if history is any guide, the surveillance will penetrate all aspects of people’s daily lives leading to toxic hostility and political polarization. Again, while many moderates may find it hard to imagine pseudo-terrorist attacks, trust in the government will not likely be restored even in this situation.
These two scenarios have one commonality: there is no foreseeable end to the turmoil. When the Communist Party brutally suppressed the democratic movement in Beijing in June 1989, order was quickly restored. With decades of rapid economic development and strict control of information, many mainland Chinese have either chosen to leave this “incident” behind and move on, or are not aware of it at all. Because of severe censorship at home, many mainlanders only learn about the Tiananmen massacre when they study abroad.
This is unlikely to happen to Hong Kong. First, even if the government really takes steps to restrict the Internet, control cannot be as draconic as that of the mainland. Businesses depend on the Internet, and Hong Kong cannot afford a large-scale divestment. Second, a strong local identity based on resistance has been established during this movement. An identity and a sense of belonging are often the strongest elements sustaining a struggle. The fight will go on, just in different forms or intensity.
Social science students are generally not good at making predictions, but I find it valuable to try to foresee what might happen out of this turmoil. Many protesters have been expressing a strong yearning for victory: “I want to win.” They, like most people around the world, want to choose their own government, enjoy civil liberties, and have their political and social rights advanced. Yet, at this stage, Hong Kongers may need to prepare for a darker future, at least in the foreseeable future.