Editor’s note: On May 27, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger will turn 100 years old. Here at The Progressive, we looked into our archives and pulled out this piece from our October 1972 issue in which Joseph Elder, a longtime Quaker peace activist, and then-board member of the American Friends Service Committee, talks about his 1969 meeting with Kissinger and of the unfulfilled opportunities for peace. In June and October of 1969, Elder traveled to Hanoi on behalf of the Friends to deliver open-heart surgical equipment for North Vietnamese civilians. Elder, who is an emeritus professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, continues his work with the people of Vietnam through the projects of Madison Quakers, Inc.
Forty months ago Henry Kissinger told five of us—directors of the American Friends Service Committee—who met with him at a closed-door session in the White House that he and President Nixon were certain they could end the war in Vietnam in six months. The date of the meeting was May 5, 1969. Little of what Kissinger said at that meeting has been published, and as far as I know, what fragments have been disclosed or speculated upon, have not been authenticated in writing until now.
What follows is my summary of the circumstances of that meeting, and of what Kissinger said. The forty months of death and destruction that have been visited upon American GIs and the people of Indochina since that day we met with the President's adviser in Washington demonstrate how totally unrealistic were the Kissinger-Nixon plans for ending the war in six months. What Kissinger said can be used today as a yardstick to judge the reliability of Administration promises for an early end to the slaughter in Vietnam.
On May 5, 1969, about one thousand Quakers held a silent vigil in front of the White House in protest against the war in Vietnam. Prior to that date, the Executive Secretary (Bronson Clark) and the Chairman (Gilbert White) of the American Friends Service Committee had corresponded with the White House, announcing our plans to hold a vigil and asking if President Nixon might be free to talk with a small delegation of us about our concerns. The White House responded by saying that the President would be unable to meet with us, but his chief foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, would be glad to. The vigil, as I recall, started at about noon. Our interview with Kissinger began about three p.m. We-—Clark, White, George Sawyer (a black lawyer), Norval Reece, and myself— were ushered past the White House sentry and into the basement of the White House.
When Kissinger joined us, he asked us whether this was going to be “on the record” or “off the record.” He indicated that he would be able to talk more openly if it were “off the record.” So we agreed not to quote directly to the press anything he said, but that we would feel free to tell the press what we said.
Kissinger’s mood at that time was quite optimistic. He said he was aware of our Quaker concerns about ending the war and explained that one reason he was now in the basement of the White House was that President Nixon had brought him there to end the war. If he didn’t succeed, he’d know it (and we would know it) because he’d be dismissed from his job. He explained that there were a number of hopeful things being worked on at the moment, but that it was important they not be aired prematurely, as that might ruin their chances of succeeding.
Kissinger’s discussion suggested that behind-the-scenes give-and-take was occurring, and that as soon as some accord was reached, the world would know it. He added that under President Johnson no policy for settling the war had been worked out (Kissinger was surprised to discover this when he moved into the White House basement). He and President Nixon were in the process of working out such a policy. And they had every reason to hope the policy would be successful.
My feeling was then (and it continues to be now) that Henry Kissinger still does not really know what’s going on in Vietnam.
He added that he understood our skepticism, since the Johnson Administration had kept seeing “light at the end of the tunnel” and various “turns in the road.” It was, as I recall, in this general context that he made the statement, “Give us six months. If we haven't ended the war then, you can come back and tear down the [White House] fence.” We assured him that Quakers didn't generally tear down fences, but that we’d keep his timetable in mind.
So much for the May meeting. We were all impressed with Kissinger’s confidence that things would be over soon. In addition to his conviction that he would lose his job if he did not get the war ended quickly was his conviction that President Nixon could not possibly be re-elected if the war were still on in 1972.
In retrospect, it would appear that Kissinger’s reasons for confidence lay in the multi-point proposal that President Nixon unveiled about one week later. It seems that he was fairly sure the North Vietnamese and the NLF would jump at the chance to settle the war along the general terms laid down by Nixon (e.g., withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam). When I read the Nixon proposal, I was amazed that Kissinger felt for a moment the North Vietnamese and NLF would agree to anything close to those terms. Even if one assumed the Nixon points were “opening bids,” positions from which one could soften, the terms seemed so patently unacceptable to the North Vietnamese and NLF I was disturbed that Kissinger would look at them with such optimism.
My feeling was then (and it continues to be now) that Henry Kissinger still does not really know what’s going on in Vietnam. He still appears to think (as he did then) that the North Vietnamese are so tired of the war that they would be willing to settle for almost anything. He doesn’t for a moment seem to sense their commitment to see this thing through now— whether it takes months, years, or decades.
So the first six months passed—then twelve and eighteen, now three and a half years. The war still goes on. The White House fence is still standing. And Henry Kissinger, I fear, is still as far out-of-touch with Vietnam as he was in 1969.
Mr. Elder, a professor of sociology and Indian studies at the University of Wisconsin in Madison, was a participant with several other Quakers in talks with North Vietnamese leaders in June and October, 1969, in Hanoi. In subsequent conversations with White House aides and Kissinger, Mr. Elder and his colleagues gave the Administration the gist of North Vietnam's proposed moves toward peace.